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Abstract: Many airline reservation systems oer the commitment option to their potential passengers. This
option allows passengers to reserve a seat for a xed duration before making a nal purchase decision. In this
study, we develop single-leg revenue management models that consider such contingent commitment decisions.
We start with a dynamic programming model of this problem. This model is computationally intractable as it
requires storing a multi-dimensional state space due to book-keeping of the committed seats. To alleviate this
diculty, we propose an alternate dynamic programming formulation that uses an approximate model of how the
contingent commitments behave and we show how to extract a capacity allocation policy from the approximate
dynamic programming formulation. In addition, we present a deterministic linear programming model that gives
an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue from the intractable dynamic programming model. As the
problem size becomes large in terms of ight capacity and the expected number of arrivals, we demonstrate an
asymptotic lower bound for the deterministic linear programming model. Our extensive numerical study indicates
that oering commitment options can noticeably increase the expected revenue even though oering a contingent
commitment option may not always be in the best interest of the airline. Also, our results show that the proposed
approximate dynamic programming model coordinates capacity allocation and commitment decisions quite well.
Keywords: Revenue management; airline; contingent commitment option; dynamic programming
1. Introduction. One of the main concerns in airline revenue management is to aid the decision
makers to come up with strategies to increase the revenue. To this end, the control of the ight capac-
ities plays an important role in most of these strategies. Capacity control is the practice of allocating
seats to dierent fare classes to maximize the total expected revenue. Recently, the airline reservation
systems started oering contingent commitment options that allow passengers to reserve a seat for a
certain duration of time within the reservation period before making a buy or a leave decision. Since a
commitment option allows passengers to keep a seat at a small fee, it has the potential to attract price
sensitive customers as well as improve overall capacity utilization. However, it also creates another source
of uncertainty leading to probable revenue loss due to empty seats.
As an example of a contingent commitment, consider a ight for which the airline oers the commitment
option for all fare classes. Customers can still buy seats as usual. However, if a customer prefers to reserve
a seat instead of buying it, then she can commit to a seat for a xed non-refundable fee. Such a passenger
would then be guaranteed a seat of the fare class until the end of a predetermined commitment period.
The length of the commitment period is xed by the airline. If the customer decides to purchase her
committed ticket within this period, then she pays the ticket fare at the time of initial inquiry. Otherwise,
she leaves the system without any reimbursement. In short, this option allows a passenger to delay her
purchase decision with seat and price guarantee for the length of the commitment period.
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Figure 1: A screen shot of a contingent commitment option (KLM Website, 2014)
In practice, there are variants of the contingent commitment option. While some airline companies
oer this option to all customers before they choose their ights, some other companies present this
option right before customers purchase their tickets. Figure 1 shows a typical screen shot from an airline
reservation website where a contingent commitment option is oered until a predetermined expiration
date. We accessed the website in November and the ight departs in December. We observe that the
website oers a single contingent commitment option and its fee is xed. Although the commitment
option resembles a typical travel insurance, there are two important dierences. First, the commitment
option holds the reservation for a xed period of time, whereas the travel insurance is valid until the
departure date. Second, contingent commitments allow passengers to exercise their options within the
commitment period. However, a travel insurance allows free cancellation only if specic circumstances,
like emergencies, arise. Therefore, a passenger is more likely to leave without exercising her contingent
commitment option than to cancel her travel insurance.
From an airline perspective, every committed seat provides an additional revenue due to the non-
refundable fee. However, reserving a seat, especially early in the reservation period, may result in re-
jecting a high fare class request at a later time, which in turn can lead to signicant revenue losses.
Therefore, the contingent commitment and the capacity control decisions should be simultaneously taken
into consideration. To simplify the discussion, we refer to immediately purchased seats as bookings in the
subsequent part.
In this paper, we address the joint problem of capacity allocation and commitment option for a single
ight leg. We focus on contingent commitment options that are oered for xed commitment fees and
predened expiration dates (as in Figure 1). We examine how oering these commitment options to
customers aects overall revenue. Our problem setting is based on two independent streams of events;
arrivals of booking and commitment requests and exercising the commitment option. At each time
period, either a commitment request or a booking request can be realized independently. We need to
decide either to accept or reject each arriving request. In other words, our policy determines whether to
Aydn, Birbil, Topaloglu: Delayed Purchases in ARM 3
keep an available seat for a particular class of customers at that time period or not. We rst introduce a
dynamic programming formulation for this problem. However, this formulation requires keeping track of
the remaining commitment time of each accepted contingent commitment request, and hence, makes use of
a high-dimensional state variable. Consequently the dynamic program becomes intractable. As a remedy,
we propose an approximation to the dynamic programming formulation that performs remarkably well as
we demonstrate in our computational study. In addition to this approximation, we present deterministic
linear programming models which provide upper bounds on value functions of the intractable dynamic
programming formulation.
To the best of our knowledge, the concept of contingent commitment options has not been previously
studied in the literature. Since the decision to leave without exercising a commitment option resembles a
cancellation, our work is related to those works on single-leg capacity allocation with overbooking. The
most relevant studies in the single-leg setting are given by Subramanian et al. (1999) and Aydn et al.
(2013). Both of these studies propose a dynamic programming model for the capacity allocation problem
with overbooking. Similar to our model, these studies allow cancellations but they consider only booking
requests with no contingent commitments. Subramanian et al. (1999) consider cancellation and booking
requests as a combined stream and assume that at most one of these events can occur at any discrete
time epoch. On the other hand, Aydn et al. (2013) model the problem in a dierent way by allowing
the arrival and cancellation processes to be independent. The main departing point of our work is that
we consider two types of products, standard bookings and contingent commitments that can be sold by
the airline. Once the airline accepts a contingent commitment request from a customer, it receives a
xed non-refundable fee and a seat is reserved for this customer for a certain duration. At the end of
this duration, the customer can either purchase the ticket or leave without making use of the contingent
commitment option. In addition, the dimension of the model that we are dealing with here is higher than
that of the model given for the overbooking problem. The number of dimensions of the state variable in
our model is equal to the length of the allowed commitment period, whereas the number of dimensions
in overbooking and cancellation models is equal to the number of fare classes. Generally, the length of
the allowed commitment period is larger than the number of fare classes.
Although we use airline reservation systems as the primary application area of this research, the
commitment option as we consider here is applicable to any industry selling xed, perishable capacity,
such as; cargo, hotel and car rental. To make our point clear, we note that hotel reservation systems
and car rental agencies are already exercising some options similar to the commitment option here. Car
rental and hotel reservation systems oer both exible and non-refundable products. While exible
products can be canceled without any penalty, non-refundable products are oered with various penalty
options like charging the rst day or the entire trip. For the non-refundable products the reservation
systems present insurance policies for a xed price. These insurance policies guarantee the refund of the
whole reservation price, if the reservation is canceled. We will revisit these cases after presenting our
models. Although, some of the problems in hotel and car rental industries are network based problems,
the methods proposed in this paper may also be applied in these applications since in practice single-leg
decomposition methods are frequently applied to network problems.
We make the following research contributions in this paper: (i) We develop a dynamic programming
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model to make the capacity allocation and contingent commitment decisions over a single ight leg.
Due to the curse of dimensionality, we propose an alternate tractable dynamic programming model
that approximates the actual contingent commitments process. (ii) We introduce deterministic linear
programming approximations that give upper bounds on the intractable dynamic programming model.
A lower bound is also obtained when the problem size becomes large in terms of capacities and the
expected number of arrivals. (iii) Through computational experiments, we analyze the eects of oering
a contingent commitment option. We demonstrate that under certain conditions, oering this option will
increase the expected revenue of the ight even though oering the contingent commitment options is
not always in the best interest of the airline. We also show that our approximate dynamic programming
model performs remarkably well.
2. Review of Related Literature. There is an extensive literature on capacity allocation problems
in revenue management. For a comprehensive review of this area, we refer reader to Phillips (2005),
Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) and McGill and van Ryzin (1999). In the subsequent part of this section, we
describe extensions to capacity allocation problems like cancellations and exible products. In addition,
we also discuss dierent options in pricing analysis and nance that are related to our work.
To compensate the revenue loss due to cancellations and no-shows, overbooking models have been
studied. Early overbooking studies mainly focus on static models. Beckman (1958), Thompson (1961),
and Coughlan (1999) develop static single leg capacity allocation and overbooking models by assuming
the demand requests are static random variables. Several researchers have concentrated on dynamic
overbooking models by considering the temporal dynamics of the demand process. Rothstein (1971) and
Chatwin (1998) present a single fare class dynamic programming model to formulate the cancellations
and the overbookings. Subramanian et al. (1999) study a more general setting than Chatwin (1998)
by extending the overbooking problem to a multi-class problem. They point out the computational
diculties of the dynamic programming formulation and propose an approximation strategy.
Later studies concentrate on mitigating the eects of demand uncertainty. Karaesmen and van Ryzin
(2004) formulate a two-stage overbooking model for multiple ight legs which allows substitution between
ight legs in case of overbooking. In the rst stage of the model, the airline takes reservations. In
the second stage, overbooked passengers are bumped to substitute ights. Shumsky and Zhang (2009)
analyze a dynamic upgrading model with xed prices. Similar to work of Karaesmen and van Ryzin
(2004), their optimal policy separates the allocation decision from the upgrade decision. On the other
hand, Gallego and Stefanescu (2009) investigate the deterministic upgrading model where prices are xed
and exible. Dierent than the previous models, they allow upgrading to any higher quality fare class.
Recently callable and exible products have been introduced in the airline industry. Callable products
give airlines the exibility of accepting expensive fare class customers instead of low fare class customers.
A buyer of such a product can be transferred to a later ight if there is no capacity left in the ight she has
booked. In that case, the airline pays a pre-specied recall price to the customer (Gallego et al. (2008),
Gallego et al. (2006)). Similarly, in exible products the airline is free to assign the buyer to any of the
pre-specied alternatives (Gallego and Phillips (2004)). Unlike the callable product, a exible product
guarantees a seat in those alternatives. Callable and exible products appeal to customers who have low
product valuation and exible travel time. Gallego and Phillips (2004) show that oering the exible
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product signicantly increases the protability. These options are also examined in the marketing science
literature. Fay and Xie (2008) work on the concept of probabilistic goods. In their study, a probabilistic
good corresponds to a set of multiple services that a buyer obtains with a probability. The probabilistic
selling denotes the selling strategy where probabilistic goods and standard products are sold together.
They examine the benets of oering probabilistic goods. Similar to the exible products, the opaque
selling option is introduced in the travel industry. In opaque selling, product alternatives are concealed
from a customer and she is unaware of the product she buys until the purchase. Anderson and Xie (2013)
present a recent study on the opaque selling option and examine the cases where opaque selling is oered
with regular full information selling. They show that oering opaque selling with regular selling improves
the customer segmentation, and hence, increases the revenues. Gallego and Stefanescu (2010) give a nice
overview of dierent options introduced in the service industries.
Lately, Sainam et al. (2009) investigate the benets of call options in sport events. This option allows
sport fans to reserve a ticket for the nal game until the teams playing in the nal are identied. If
the option buyer decides to attend the game, she pays for the nal. Otherwise, she cancels the tick-
et. Sainam et al. (2009) show that the call options provide extra revenue when they are oered with
the advance purchase option. Balseiro et al. (2011) extend the work of Sainam et al. (2009) by including
pricing analysis of call options. They propose a two-stage optimization model. In the rst stage, a pricing
problem is solved and in the second stage, given the xed prices, the capacity allocation problem is solved.
The problem is intractable. Therefore, they propose a deterministic approximation. Gallego and Sahin
(2010) work on the partially refundable fares and show that oering partially refundable fares is more
protable than oering non-refundable and fully refundable fares. They propose an inter-temporal val-
uations model by considering both capacity provider and consumer. The commitment option that we
discuss here can be considered as a special case of partially refundable fares where the passengers can get
the refund, if they leave during the commitment period. However, these contingent commitment options
bring an additional source of complexity as they can be utilized only within a certain time window.
Contingent commitments in our study are somewhat similar to the options in the nance literature.
That literature focuses on pricing and exercise time of options. An option pricing problem can be
modeled as a Markov decision problem. However, the resulting problem is hard to solve due to the curse of
dimensionality. One approach is to use Monte Carlo simulation to generate good solutions (see for instance
Board et al. (2003) for the pricing of European options). Another approach is to apply approximate
dynamic programming to give lower and upper bounds on the value of the option (Longsta and Schwartz,
2001; Tsitsiklis and Roy, 2001; Haugh and Kogan, 2008). The pricing problem is also approximated by
solving linear programming models (Dempster and Hutton, 1999). We refer the reader to Trigeorgis
(1996) for the review of pricing models. Several researchers work on the optimal time of exercising
the real option. McDonald and Siegel (1986) work on the investment timing problem for an irreversible
project and develop an investment rule when the value and the cost of the project are both stochastic.
Rhys et al. (2002) use a rst passage time approach to obtain expected waiting time to exercise an
option. Han and Park (2008) develop a model to determine the exercise timing by considering the trade-
o between early exercising and waiting.
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3. Problem Formulation. We have a single ight leg with m fare classes and capacity C. The
reservation horizon is partitioned into T time periods, and the ight departs at the beginning of period
T + 1. Figure 2 summarizes an arrival process in the booking horizon. At each time period, at most one
customer arrives to the system with a particular fare class in mind. If this fare class is open for purchase,
then the customer either purchases the ticket (Case 1) or decides to pay for the contingent commitment
option. If the customer goes for the option, then she pays the option fee and is guaranteed a seat for the
next s time periods. Right before the option expires, the customer decides whether or not to exercise the
option and purchase the ticket. If the customer exercises the option, then she pays the airfare (Case 2).
Otherwise, the option expires (Case 3).
Customer Request
time
Exercise Option
Purchase Ticket
Purchase Option
t+ s
(Case 2)
Leave (Case 3)
Reject Accept
(Case 1)
t
Figure 2: Dynamics following the arrival of a customer request at time t
Next, we formally dene the problem and introduce our remaining notations. A customer that is
interested in fare class i arrives at time period t with probability it. Then, she buys the commitment
option with probability i or books the seat with probability (1   i). In other words, booking and
commitment requests for fare class i arrive with probabilities pit = it(1 i) and qit = iti, respectively.
We assume that
Pm
i=1(pit + qit)  1 for all t 2 f1; :::; Tg and denote the probability of having no arrival
by p0t = 1  
Pm
i=1(pit + qit). After s time periods, she exercises the option and buys the seat with
probability pb or leaves the system with probability pl = 1  pb.
As we pointed out in our preceding discussion, at each time period, we have to decide whether to
accept or reject the arriving fare class request. When we accept a booking request for fare class i, then
we generate a revenue of fi. When we accept a commitment request for fare class i, we gain a xed
non-refundable revenue f c at the period of request. After s periods, we generate a revenue of fi with
probability pb, if the same customer decides to buy the ticket she had committed to. Talluri and van Ryzin
(2004, Section 4.4.2) demonstrate that there is no dierence in the total expected revenue if the accepted
customer is charged at the time of reservation or later. Therefore, the expected revenue of an accepted
commitment request for fare class i is i := f
c + pbfi. Each type of request consumes one capacity unit
on the ight leg and the rejected requests or unexercised options simply leave the system.
We denote the total number of bookings and accepted commitments at a time period (decision
epoch) t by xt. To store the accepted contingent commitments between time periods t   s and t,
we designate an s-dimensional binary vector, zt. If there is an accepted commitment in one of the
periods ft   s; t   s + 1;    ; t   1g, then the corresponding component of zt equals to 1; otherwise,
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it is set to 0. The pair xt and zt represents the state in our dynamic programming model of the
problem. Note that the rst element of zt shows if there is a commitment request by a customer s
time periods ago. At each time period, we need to check if there is such a customer and determine
whether she makes an actual purchase decision or not. Letting z1t be the rst element of zt, the
leaving passenger without making an actual purchase decision is represented by a Bernoulli random
variable B(z1t; pl) having a success probability of pl. As we move from period t to t + 1, the rst
element of zt needs to be dropped, and zt+1 is constructed by appending a binary variable to the
remaining s 1 elements of zt. To denote this shifting operation, we dene   : f0; 1gs+1 7! f0; 1gs given by
 (z; ) = [0 Is]
"
z

#
;
where 0 is an s-dimensional column vector consisting of zeros, Is is an ss identity matrix, and  2 f0; 1g.
Using now this notation, if we accept a commitment request at time t+1, then zt+1 =  (zt; 1); otherwise,
zt+1 =  (zt; 0).
We capture the decisions at time period t by an m-dimensional binary vector ut = [u1t; u2t;    ; umt]|
where uit takes value 1 if we accept an arriving reservation request for fare class i at time period t, and
takes value 0 if we reject an arriving reservation request at time period t. Since our accept-reject decision
depends on the available capacity, the set of feasible decisions at time period t is given by
Ut(xt) = fut 2 f0; 1gm : xt + uit  C; i = 1; 2;    ;mg:
We are ready to formulate the problem as a dynamic program. Let Jt(xt; zt) denote the expected
optimal revenue from t up to T given that at time period t, the total number of bookings and commitments
is xt and the commitment history for s periods is zt. By the independence of the arrival and the
commitment processes and the dynamic programming optimality principle, we obtain for every 1  xt 
C, zt 2 f0; 1gs and t = 1; 2;    ; s that
Jt(xt; zt) = max
ut2U(xt)
 mX
i=1
pit
n
fiuit + Jt+1(xt + uit; (zt; 0))
o
+
mX
i=1
qit
n
iuit + Jt+1(xt + uit; (zt; uit))
o
+ p0tJt+1(xt; (zt; 0))

(1a)
and for s < t  T ,
Jt(xt; zt) = max
ut2U(xt)
 mX
i=1
pit
n
fiuit + EJt+1(xt + uit  B(z1t; pl); (zt; 0))
o
+
mX
i=1
qit
n
iuit + EJt+1(xt + uit  B(z1t; pl); (zt; uit))
o
+
p0tEJt+1(xt  B(z1t; pl); (zt; 0))

: (1b)
The boundary condition is simply JT+1(xT+1; zT+1) = 0. Since a contingent commitment makes the
purchase decision at the end of the commitment period, we do not observe any commitment purchase
decisions during the rst s time periods. Since options expire at the end of commitment period, we need
to compute the expectation of optimal value functions using a Bernoulli event after time period s. This
means for z1t = 1 that
EJt+1(xt + uit  B(z1t; pl); (zt; 0)) = pbJt+1(xt + uit; (zt; 0)) + plJt+1(xt + uit   1; (zt; 0)):
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Clearly, J1(0;0) gives the optimal expected total revenue at the beginning of the planning horizon, where
0 represents the fact that we start with no commitments.
4. Approximate Model. We note that the state variable zt in the dynamic model may involve
many dimensions in actual applications. Thus, solving the recursive equation through standard dynamic
programming tools can be computationally demanding. Therefore, we propose an approximation to our
dynamic programming formulation. Our approximation hinges on the assumption that each commitment,
independently of other commitments, can exercise, leave or retain with probabilities qe, ql, and qr at each
time period until the departure of the ight. We calibrate these probabilities so that the expected
amount of time that a contingent commitment stays in the system is exactly s periods, and a contingent
commitment results in a nal purchasing decision with probability pb, which is the probability that a
customer with a commitment purchases the ticket in the original model. In other words, we choose qr
and qe such that 1=(1  qr) = s and pb = qe + qeqr + qeq2r + : : : Thus, each accepted commitment request
eventually buys the ticket with probability pb. Therefore, as in Section 3, i = f
c + pbfi gives the
expected revenue obtained from a fare class i commitment request. Observe that the proposed way of
calculating pb somewhat underestimates the value of qe as this sum, at any time period t, should involve
only T   t terms and not innite terms. However, if we use such a nite sum, then we have to use a time
dependent qe parameter, which disagrees with our approximation approach. Once we choose qr and qe
in this fashion, we obtain ql = 1  qr   qe.
Furthermore given that there are y accepted commitments, the random numbers of exercised, Me(y),
not exercised, Ml(y) and retained, Mr(y) commitments in period t follow collectively the multinomial
distribution with parameters qe, ql, qr, and number of trials y. Note that under this probabilistic setting,
a committed passenger may stay in the system until the departure time. We also assume that an accepted
commitment request cannot make a buy or leave decision in the time period she is accepted. We believe
that this assumption is more realistic since in practice the duration of a time period is quite short. An
appealing feature of this modeling approach is that it avoids the necessity to keep track of how long
each accepted contingent commitment has been in the system since a contingent commitment makes a
decision to exercise, leaves or retain the option at each time period independently. In this case, the state
variable in the dynamic programming formulation of the commitment problem collapses to two scalars;
the number of bookings and the number of accepted contingent commitments.
Let xt and yt be the total number of reservations (including both contingent commitments and book-
ings) and contingent commitments at time period t, respectively. Then, the recursive equations for the
proposed approximate dynamic programming model is given by
Vt(xt; yt) = max
ut2U(xt)
 mX
i=1
pit
n
fiuit + EVt+1(xt + uit  Ml(yt);Mr(yt))
o
+
mX
i=1
qit
n
iuit + EVt+1(xt + uit  Ml(yt);Mr(yt) + uit)
o
+ (2)
p0tEVt+1(xt  Ml(yt);Mr(yt))

:
Again, the boundary condition is simply VT+1(xT+1; yT+1) = 0. In this formulation, xt  Ml(yt) and
Mr(yt) represent the remaining number of reservations and commitments, given the state of reservations
at the beginning of time period t is (xt; yt) and we do not accept anybody during that time period. On
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the other hand, if we accept a commitment request at time period t, the state of the system becomes
(xt + 1  Ml(yt);Mr(yt) + 1), since we assume that commitments cannot leave within the period they
are accepted.
Note that in both models, the purchase probability of a contingent commitment is class independent.
In case of the dynamic model (1a)-(1b), we could have relaxed this assumption and worked with class
dependent purchase probabilities. Then, we would have needed to store the fare class of each accepted
commitment, which would have required holding even a larger state space. In case of the approximate
model (2), however, qe and qr values are class independent by denition. We could have used weighted
averages to set both probabilities. In fact this was the approximation used by Aydn et al. (2013). If we
had used such an approach, then we would have added one more level of approximation to our dynamic
programming model. Therefore, we avoided this kind of construction and decided to work with a purchase
probability that is class independent.
Before we discuss the optimal policy, let us note that the way we use the commitment option in the
approximate dynamic model resembles similar options oered in the service industry. For instance, the
insurance policies are also commonly oered to guarantee reservations. In this case, the customers can
leave at any time until they receive the service. However, this default option in insurance policies is just
an assumption in our approximate model.
The optimal policy of problem (2) can be summarized as follows: Given the state variables (xt; yt) at
time period t, the optimal decisions at time period t are given by
uit =
(
1; if (1  i)(fi + Vt+1(xt + 1; yt)) + i(i + Vt+1(xt + 1; yt + 1))  Vt+1(xt; yt) and xt < C;
0; otherwise:
(3)
Next, we present that optimal decisions have a nested structure under certain conditions. We defer the
proof of the proposition to the appendix.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose the probability of a request being a commitment is class independent; that is,
1 = 2 =    = m. Then, given the fare ordering f1  f2  :::  fm, and hence, the ordering of the
expected commitment revenues, 1  2  :::  m, we have u1t  u2t  :::  umt; t = 1; :::; T .
The assumption in Proposition 4.1 seems crucial as we can give a simple counter example where the
optimal policy does not have a nested structure. Figure 3 illustrates such an example. Given that there
are x = 1 reservations and y = 0 commitments at the beginning of each time period, the optimal decisions
are computed. The optimal policy table is given in the lower part of the gure. As this table shows,
although a request for the low fare class is accepted, the expensive fare class request is rejected for the
rst two periods.
5. Deterministic Linear Program. An alternate approximation approach is to model a deter-
ministic linear program (DLP) that corresponds to the dynamic programming model (1a)-(1b). In this
problem, our decision variables are the number of accepted reservations for each fare class at each time
period and the remaining capacity at the beginning of each time period. To formulate this linear pro-
gram, let wit be the number of the bookings and commitments that we plan to accept for fare class i at
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1
1 2 3 4
13 = 0:6
23 = 0:4
12 = 0:5
22 = 0:5
11 = 0:3
21 = 0:7
1 = 0:1 2 = 0:9
uit
1
1
1
01st fare class
2nd fare class
0
Optimal Policy Table,(x,y)=(1,0)
Figure 3: A counter example when the assumption in Proposition 4.1 does not hold under class dependent
commitment request probabilities (m = 2, C = 25, f1 = 26, f2 = 25, f
c = 10, s = 2, pb = 0:7)
time period t. We also denote the remaining capacity at time period t by #t. Since an arriving customer
either buys the commitment option with probability i or books the seat with probability (1   i), the
expected number of booked and committed fare class i seats at time period t are given by (1 i)wit and
iwit, respectively. Consequently, the total expected number of reservations accepted at time period t isPm
i=1 wit. Then, the deterministic linear program has the following form:
maximize
TX
t=1
mX
i=1
fi(1  i)wit +
TX
t=1
mX
i=1
iiwit (4)
subject to #1 = C; (5)
#t = #t 1  
mX
i=1
(1  i)wi(t 1)  
mX
i=1
iwi(t 1); t = 2;    ; s+ 1; (6)
#t = #t 1  
mX
i=1
(1  i)wi(t 1)  
mX
i=1
iwi(t 1) +
mX
i=1
iwi(t s 1)pl; t = s+ 2;    ; T; (7)
#T+1 = #T  
mX
i=1
(1  i)wiT  
mX
i=1
iwiT +
TX
k=T s
mX
i=1
iwikpl; (8)
mX
i=1
wit  #t; t = 1; :::; T; (9)
wit  it; i = 1; :::;m; t = 1; :::; T; (10)
#t  0; t = 1; :::; T + 1; (11)
wit  0; i = 1; :::;m; t = 1; :::; T: (12)
Constraints (5)-(8) keep track of the remaining capacity at each time period. Constraints (9) ensure
that the accepted reservations at each time period do not exceed the available capacity at the beginning
of that time period. Similarly, constraints (10) guarantee that the reservation requests that we plan
to accept do not exceed the expected number of arrivals. Moreover, due to constraints (10), arriving
requests can be accepted partially. Note that the nonnegativity constraint on #t prevents overbooking.
By substituting constraints (5)-(7) into constraint (8) and rewriting #T+1 in terms of #t, t 2 f1;    ; Tg,
we obtain that #T+1 = C  
PT
t=1
Pm
i=1 wit + pl
PT
t=1
Pm
i=1 iwit. Since #T+1  0, by rearranging the
terms we observe that
PT
t=1
Pm
i=1(1   i)wit + (1   pl)
PT
t=1
Pm
i=1 iwit  C. In addition, an accepted
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commitment customer does not exercise the option with probability pl, and hence, the available capacity
increases in this case. Therefore, the total expected number of assigned seats (bookings and option
buyers) may exceed the capacity. In this model, this excess amount depends on the probability of not
exercising. We denote the optimal objective function value of (4)-(12) by ZDLP .
There are two uses of DLP. First, it gives a policy to accept or reject the product requests. Let
fwit; 8i; tg be the optimal value of the decision variables in problem (4)-(12). Then, according to the
policy dictated by DLP, a booking or a commitment request is accepted with probability wit=it. Second,
its optimal objective value provides an upper bound on the maximum expected revenue over the whole
planning horizon. This is an intuitive consequence of the linear programming approximation to a dynamic
model. In fact, results similar to the next proposition widely appear in revenue management literature;
see Talluri and van Ryzin (1998) and Gallego and van Ryzin (1997).
Proposition 5.1 The optimal objective value of the DLP model gives an upper bound on the dynamic
programming model (1a)-(1b). That is, J1(0;0)  ZDLP .
The proof of Proposition 5.1 is given in the appendix. We can obtain a tighter upper bound by using
a randomized linear program. This is a well-known result in the revenue management literature and it
involves a somewhat standard analysis. Therefore, we omit this discussion and refer interested reader to
Talluri and van Ryzin (1999) and Kunnumkal et al. (2011). Instead, we focus on obtaining an asymptotic
lower bound. To obtain this bound, we make use of another upper bounding problem as we explain next.
Note that problem (4)-(12) ensures that the remaining capacity at each time period, #t, is non-negative.
By relaxing this constraint, we can give an upper bound on the DLP model (4)-(12) as follows:
maximize
TX
t=1
mX
i=1
fi(1  i)wit +
TX
t=1
mX
i=1
iiwit (13)
subject to
TX
t=1
mX
i=1
(1  i)wit +
TX
t=1
mX
i=1
pbiwit  C; (14)
wit  it; i = 1; :::;m; t = 1; :::; T; (15)
wit  0; i = 1; :::;m; t = 1; :::; T: (16)
In constraint (14), pb = 1 pl is the probability of exercising the option. We denote the optimal objective
function of this model by ZDLP UB . Here, constraint (14) is obtained by substituting constraints (5)-(7)
into constraint (8).
Remark 5.1 When there is no commitment option (s = 0) or the probability of buying the committed
seat equals to 1 (pb = 1), DLP given by (4)-(12) boils down to the standard capacity allocation problem.
Furthermore, when ZDLP UB = Z

DLP , the dual variables corresponding to constraints (5)-(8) in problem
(4)-(12) are all equal. Therefore, the dual of problem (4)-(12) can be reduced to a one-dimensional
unconstrained problem, and it can be solved very eciently by any variant of the bisection method.
Now we are ready to obtain an asymptotic lower bound on the distance between the optimal objective
function value of DLP and the optimal expected revenue of the dynamic programming model (1a)-(1b).
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Our analysis follows a similar approach as in Gallego et al. (2004). However, in our case, we need to
consider the expiration of the option explicitly. To provide an asymptotic bound, we scale the capacity of
the ight and the expected demand linearly with the same rate . We introduce a sequence of problems
fP :  2 Z+g indexed by parameter . Problem P has T time periods in the planning horizon and
the capacity of the ight is C. Moreover, the arrival probabilities it at time periods f(t 1)+1; :::; tg
in problem P are the same as the arrival probabilities at time period t in problem P1. Therefore, the
probability of a reservation request for fare class i at time period t is given by idt=e, where operator
d:e rounds up the values passed to it. We note that the problem described in Section 3 is P1. The ight
capacity in problem P is  times the capacity of the ight in problem P 1. Similarly, the length of the
booking horizon in problem P is  times the length of the booking horizon in problem P1. Consequently,
the expected total booking demand and the expected total commitment demand for fare class i in problem
P is
TX
t=1
idt=e = 
TX
t=1
it:
This implies that the expected numbers of reservation requests in problem P are  times larger than
those in problem P1. Consequently, problem P is a scaled version of problem P1.
Our goal is to explore how the performance of the policy derived from the deterministic linear program
changes as the capacity on the ight leg and the demand progressively get larger. We do not scale the
length of the commitment horizon s, but the commitments do not lose their importance in our asymptotic
scaling regime, since as we scale up the demand, the number of customers that purchase the commitment
option also scales up.
We consider the linear programming model (13)-(16) for problem P. Let ZDLP UB denote the
optimal objective value of the upper bound on DLP for the scaled problem P. Likewise, ZDLP denotes
the optimal objective value of the scaled deterministic linear program given by problem (4)-(12), and
J1 (0;0) stands for the optimal expected total revenue for the scaled problem P that we obtain by
solving the corresponding dynamic program. Proposition 5.1 shows that the optimal objective value of
the deterministic linear program provides an upper bound on the optimal expected total revenue. Thus,
we have ZDLP  J1 (0;0). Since ZDLP UB  ZDLP , we also have ZDLP UB  J1 (0;0). The lower
bound on these inequalities along with an asymptotic behavior are shown in the next proposition. We
give the proof of this result in the appendix.
Proposition 5.2 Given  2 [1  pb; 1] and  > 0, we have
ZDLP UB  ZDLP  J1 (0;0) 

1    CV
2
2

ZDLP UB ;
where CV denotes the maximum coecient of variation over bookings and commitments for all fare
classes (see the appendix). Therefore,
pb  lim
!1
J1 (0;0)
ZDLP
 1:
The rst part of this proposition gives a lower bound for the scaled problems of DLP and the dynamic
programming model (1a)-(1b). The asymptotic result in the second part implies that the optimal objective
function value of the DLP is at most 1=pb multiple of the dynamic model as the problem size gets large
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in terms of the capacity and the expected demand. This limiting behavior also shows that DLP becomes
asymptotically tight as pb becomes closer to 1. This is expected, since the commitment problem becomes
a standard capacity allocation problem when pb = 1 (Talluri and van Ryzin, 1998).
6. Computational Experiments. In this section, we conduct simulation experiments to evaluate
the eects of oering the contingent commitment option. We also provide a sensitivity analysis with
respect to various parameters. Moreover, we compare the performance of our dynamic model against
other benchmark strategies. We begin by describing the benchmark strategies.
Approximate Dynamic Model (ADM): This is the solution method that we develop in this paper.
That is, we solve the dynamic program in (2) to obtain the optimal policy. Then, we use the decision
rule (3) as our accept-reject policy for booking and commitment requests.
Standard Booking Strategy (SBS): This policy ignores the commitment requests and only accepts
the standard booking requests. Therefore, the no arrival probability at time period t becomes (1  Pm
i=1 pit) in this policy. The optimal booking policy is then determined by solving the problem as a
standard capacity allocation problem (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004, Section 2.5).
Deterministic Linear Program (DLP): This is the solution method described in Section 5. We
solve the problem (4)-(12) to obtain the optimal values of the variables wit. Provided that there is
sucient remaining capacity, we accept a reservation request for fare class i with probability wit=it at
time period t.
In the sequel, we refer to the average revenue obtained by the optimal policy of the dynamic model
given by (1a)-(1b) as DM. Recall that this model is computationally intractable for long commitment
periods. Hence, we test the models with respect to DM for only small instances. We simulate the arrival
of reservation requests and option decisions over discrete time periods f1; :::; Tg. At each time period,
we rst generate an arrival request and then apply the corresponding policy. While an accepted booking
request for fare class i generates a revenue of fi, an accepted commitment request generates a revenue of
f c. After the arrival process, we check whether there is a commitment made s periods ago and simulate
a purchase or leave decision. Each commitment passenger in fare class i buys the ticket with probability
pb generating an additional revenue of fi, or leaves the system.
To test the performances of the booking policies against varying arrival intensities, we use the load
factor parameter . Noting that the total expected demand for the ight is
PT
t=1
Pm
i=1(pit + pbqit), the
load factor is given by
 =
PT
t=1
Pm
i=1(pit + pbqit)
C
:
The way we generate arrival probabilities is quite similar to the one given by Aydn et al. (2013). We
assume that the lower fare class requests arrive more frequently than the higher fare classes in early
periods. In all our numerical experiments, we set the capacity of the plane, the length of the planning
horizon and the number of fare classes to C = 100, T = 300 and m = 4, respectively. The fares are
evenly distributed between 250 and 1; 000.
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6.1 Benchmarking Study. Our experimental design is based on various factors of the load factor
(), the commitment period (s), the commitment fee (f c), the probability of buying the committed seat
(pb), and the splitting probability of commitment arrivals (). We use load factor values  2 f1:2; 1:6g
corresponding to low and high loads. We select the commitment period lengths from the set f5; 25; 50g
to represent short, medium and long commitment intervals. The commitment fees f c 2 f40; 80g are used
to represent low and high fees. We also test the models for varying buy probabilities pb 2 f0:4; 0:7g. The
last parameter set comes from the splitting probability of contingent commitments (i values). We give
two sets of values to represent low and high commitment arrivals. These are L := (0:10; 0:15; 0:20; 0:25)
and H := (0:40; 0:45; 0:50; 0:55) where the values in each set are ordered from expensive to cheap fare
class. We label our test problems by using all combinations of these parameters.
As mentioned in Section 5, DLP provides an upper bound on the maximum total expected revenue
obtained by the dynamic model over the time periods f1; :::; Tg. Moreover, we also show that the optimal
objective function value of DLP is at most 1=pb multiple of the dynamic model as the problem size gets
large in terms of the capacity and the expected demand. Table 1 shows the optimal expected revenues
obtained by DM (J1(0;0)) and DLP (Z

DLP ) for dierent test instances. The rst four columns indicate
the characteristics of the test instances. The next two columns give the optimal objective values of DM
and DLP, respectively. The last column gives the percentage gaps with respect to ZDLP . We compare
the expected revenues for s = 5. The results show that the upper bound provided by DLP is within 1.5%
of DM. In particular, for the test instances with high load factor and high commitment demand, this
percentage gap drops down. We observe that the quality of the upper bound seems to be mostly aected
by the tightness of the ight capacity.
Table 1: Optimal expected revenues (s = 5)
Instances % Gap with DM
  f c pb DM DLP DLP
40 0.4 65,657 66,420 1.16%
H
40 0.7 64,390 65,185 1.23%
80 0.4 68,251 69,045 1.16%
1.2
80 0.7 66,563 67,391 1.24%
40 0.4 63,547 64,339 1.25%
L
40 0.7 62,899 63,687 1.25%
80 0.4 64,308 65,116 1.26%
80 0.7 63,622 64,424 1.26%
40 0.4 75,598 76,113 0.68%
H
40 0.7 74,469 75,101 0.85%
80 0.4 78,072 78,583 0.65%
1.6
80 0.7 76,563 77,198 0.83%
40 0.4 73,582 74,214 0.86%
L
40 0.7 73,002 73,664 0.91%
80 0.4 74,259 74,890 0.85%
80 0.7 73,649 74,310 0.90%
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Next, we test the performances of the models against the dynamic model given by (1a)-(1b). We
estimate the net expected revenues by simulating the arrivals of booking and commitment requests over
5,000 sample paths. We set the length of the commitment period to 5 for the instances where we compare
our models with respect to DM. Table 2 shows the average total revenues and percentage gaps between
DM and the remaining solution methods. The rst four columns in Table 2 show the characteristics of
the test instances. The next four columns give the expected total revenues obtained by DM, ADM, SBS,
and DLP, respectively. The last three columns give the percentage gaps between DM and the remaining
solution methods. Comparing the percentage gaps under this setup, we observe that the performances of
DM and ADM are very close, especially for high values of buy probabilities pb. In the worst-case, which
corresponds to the value of pb = 0:4, the gap between ADM and DM is less than 0.1%. Moreover as the
load factor increases, the percentage gap between DM and ADM decreases. When the arrival intensity is
high, models can compensate the revenue loss due to empty seats. On the other hand, we observe that
there is a noticeable performance gap between ADM and SBS. The performance of SBS improves slightly
when the load factor is high and splitting probability is low. However even in this case, it performs worse
than ADM. A noteworthy observation is the relatively large dierence between ADM and SBS even when
the load factor is high ( = 1:6) and the splitting probability is low (L). Because in this case there is
ample booking requests to use the full capacity of the ight.
Table 2: Average total revenues over 5,000 runs (s = 5)
Instances % Gap with DM
  f c pb DM ADM SBS DLP ADM SBS DLP
40 0.4 65,748 65,732 51,455 64,062 0.024% 21.738% 2.564%
H
40 0.7 64,443 64,437 42,685 62,684 0.010% 33.764% 2.730%
80 0.4 68,298 68,294 51,455 66,540 0.007% 24.660% 2.574%
1.2
80 0.7 66,459 66,453 42,685 64,648 0.009% 35.772% 2.725%
40 0.4 63,543 63,541 60,362 61,872 0.003% 5.007% 2.630%
L
40 0.7 62,883 62,883 58,056 61,230 0.001% 7.677% 2.629%
80 0.4 64,313 64,308 60,362 62,602 0.008% 6.143% 2.660%
80 0.7 63,595 63,595 58,056 61,922 0.000% 8.710% 2.631%
40 0.4 75,579 75,569 63,738 73,508 0.014% 15.667% 2.740%
H
40 0.7 74,435 74,434 56,267 72,257 0.002% 24.409% 2.926%
80 0.4 78,049 78,043 63,738 75,891 0.009% 18.336% 2.765%
1.6
80 0.7 76,543 76,541 56,267 74,315 0.003% 26.490% 2.911%
40 0.4 73,547 73,545 71,411 71,505 0.003% 2.905% 2.776%
L
40 0.7 72,964 72,963 69,289 70,972 0.001% 5.036% 2.730%
80 0.4 74,221 74,220 71,411 72,162 0.001% 3.787% 2.774%
80 0.7 73,607 73,606 69,289 71,597 0.002% 5.867% 2.731%
Next, we report our results for larger values of the commitment period, s. For comparison, we also
present the results obtained when s is 5. Table 3 presents the performances of the benchmark strategies
with respect to various test instances. The columns have the same interpretation as in Table 2. To
emphasize the eect of the commitment decision in these experiments, we x the commitment fee to the
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highest value, f c = 80. As depicted in Table 3, the total expected revenues decrease as the length of
the commitment period increases since the revenues obtained from the contingent commitments decrease
with the length of the commitment period. However, this loss can be compensated with the later arrivals
of the booking requests. Thus, the decrease in revenue is more striking when the arrival intensity is
low ( = 1:2). On the other hand, the results indicate that ADM consistently provides the highest
total expected revenues. However as the length of the commitment period increases, the percentage gaps
between ADM and the other solution methods decrease. This behavior can be attributed to the impact
of the commitment period on retain, buy and leave probabilities. Recall that qr = (s   1)=s; so, qr
increases as the length of the commitment period increases. Therefore, when s is high, our proposed
dynamic model presumes that each accepted commitment request waits until the departure time for
purchasing or cancelling the option (over-estimates the commitment period). Consequently, it may fail
to capture the actual dynamics of the system and its performance deteriorates. Moreover, as the length
of the commitment period increases, there exist instances where the performances of SBS and DLP are
somewhat close.
The results indicate that oering a contingent commitment option is most benecial when the purchase
probability is high and the length of the commitment period is short. When we compare the performances
of ADM and SBS, we observe that oering the commitment option brings in a signicant revenue increase,
even if the customer arrival intensity for this option is low.
6.2 When to Oer the Commitment Option. In this part, we investigate the eects of the
contingent commitment option. We set the load factor () to 1.6, the length of the commitment period
(s) to 50, and the commitment fee (f c) to 80. The splitting probabilities of commitments for all fare
classes are set to the same value of 0.5. Initially, we study the potential revenue improvements of oering
the commitment option relative to oering only standard bookings. Since the dynamic model (1a)-(1b) is
computationally intractable for long commitment periods, we make an analysis on the approximate model
(2). To measure the eect of commitment option, we generate two models which accept the contingent
commitment requests during a limited time period. While the rst model allows commitment arrivals
only in the rst  periods, the second model allows them only in the last  . These models are denoted by
FCM and LCM, respectively. The time period of length  during which any commitment requests may
be processed is called commitment interval. For instance,  = 10 means that FCM allows commitments
during only the rst 10 periods and LCM allows them only in the last 10 periods. On the other hand,
when  = T , both FCM and LCM boil down to the ADM model where commitment arrivals are allowed
during the whole reservation horizon.
Figure 4 shows the optimal objective values of these models with respect to dierent purchase proba-
bilities. In this gure, the horizontal axis represents the commitment interval  . As Figure 4 shows, FCM
performs better than LCM when the probability of purchase is low. Due to a high retain probability (qr)
and low purchase probability (pb), oering the commitment option later in the reservation horizon may
result in empty seats. Since FCM accepts contingent commitment requests early in the reservation peri-
od, it can compensate the empty seats resulting from not exercised commitments with the late booking
arrivals.
On the other hand, as the purchase probability increases, the performance of LCM improves. Since
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Table 3: Average total revenues over 5,000 runs (f c = 80)
Instances % Gap with ADM
  s pb ADM SBS DLP SBS DLP
5 0.4 68,294 51,455 66,540 24.656% 2.568%
5 0.7 66,453 42,685 64,648 35.767% 2.716%
H
25 0.4 67,583 51,455 66,103 23.864% 2.190%
25 0.7 66,280 42,685 64,603 35.560% 2.530%
50 0.4 66,541 51,455 65,239 22.671% 1.957%
1.2
50 0.7 65,831 42,685 64,260 35.160% 2.386%
5 0.4 64,308 60,362 62,602 6.135% 2.653%
5 0.7 63,595 58,056 61,922 8.710% 2.631%
L
25 0.4 64,139 60,362 62,488 5.889% 2.574%
25 0.7 63,514 58,056 61,846 8.594% 2.626%
50 0.4 63,885 60,362 62,273 5.515% 2.523%
50 0.7 63,401 58,056 61,738 8.431% 2.623%
5 0.4 78,043 63,738 75,891 18.329% 2.757%
5 0.7 76,541 56,267 74,315 26.488% 2.908%
H
25 0.4 76,819 63,738 74,910 17.028% 2.485%
25 0.7 76,067 56,267 74,069 26.030% 2.627%
50 0.4 75,264 63,738 73,286 15.314% 2.628%
1.6
50 0.7 75,385 56,267 73,413 25.361% 2.616%
5 0.4 74,220 71,411 72,162 3.786% 2.773%
5 0.7 73,606 69,289 71,597 5.865% 2.729%
L
25 0.4 73,943 71,411 72,013 3.424% 2.610%
25 0.7 73,497 69,289 71,600 5.725% 2.581%
50 0.4 73,540 71,411 71,633 2.895% 2.593%
50 0.7 73,303 69,289 71,467 5.476% 2.505%
expensive fare class customers arrive later than the low-fare customers and the retain probability is high,
FCM rejects the early commitment requests to keep seats for expensive fare class customers. Hence, it
loses the potential revenue obtained from commitment reservations. Moreover, when pb is low, we observe
that allowing commitment arrivals during the whole planning period is not advantageous for FCM. Since
the purchase probability is low, customers accepted towards the end of the booking horizon may result
in empty seats.
Next, we investigate the eect of the commitment period on the total expected revenue. Figure 5
plots the changes in optimal objective values of FCM and LCM with respect to dierent lengths of the
commitment interval and the commitment period when pb is low. Let 
 denote the commitment interval
value at which the maximum total expected revenue is obtained either by FCM or LCM in Figure 5. As
the length of the commitment period (s) increases, the value of  for FCM shifts to the beginning of
the reservation period. Recall that the retain probability is positively correlated with the length of the
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(a) pb = 0:25 (b) pb = 0:75
Figure 4: The eect of commitments on the total expected revenue for various buy probabilities
commitment period. Therefore, as s increases, the probability of waiting until the end of the reservation
horizon (retain probability of a contingent commitment) also increases. As a result when pb is low, it
becomes more protable for FCM to accept the commitment requests early in the reservation period
and reserve seats for the late arrivals of expensive fare class customers. Similarly when s is high, it is
more protable for LCM to limit the commitment arrivals and  for LCM shifts towards the end of
the reservation period. However, even in this case, oering contingent commitment options can provide
additional revenue compared to only oering standard booking products (when the commitment interval
is 0).
(a) Total expected revenue of FCM (b) Total expected revenue of LCM
Figure 5: Change in the total expected revenue with respect to dierent s values (pb=0.25)
In summary, Figure 4 depicts that accepting the commitment requests up to a certain time period is
more protable than accepting them during the whole reservation period when the purchase probability pb
of the contingent commitment option is low. As the purchase probability increases, allowing commitment
arrivals during the whole period becomes more advantageous. In addition, oering a commitment option
towards the end of the reservation period is more benecial than oering it at the beginning of the
reservation period when the purchase probability is high. Moreover, Figure 5 shows the eect of the
length of the commitment period on the total revenue. We observe that as the length of the commitment
period increases, it becomes more protable to decrease the length of the time period during which the
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commitment option is oered.
6.3 An Alternate Simulation with Flexible Commitment Options. In this simulation study,
we relax the assumption related to the purchase decision of the committed seats. In our proposed models,
we assumed that the customers who committed to a seat make the buy or leave decision at the end of
the commitment period. Although this is quite often the case, sometimes those customers may purchase
the seat or leave at any time within the commitment period. In this section, we simulate such a setting.
We implement ADM as in Section 4 without any changes. In our simulation, we assume that after
committing to a seat, it is equally likely for a customer to make a decision in each one of the s periods.
Since we compare the benchmark strategies for long commitment periods, we were not able to solve
the DM model in this analysis. Our results are summarized in Table 4. The commitment fee is set to
f c = 80. Comparing the total expected revenues in Table 3 against those given in Table 4, we notice that
the total net revenues obtained by the policies of all solution methods slightly improve in this alternate
simulation. Since customers more frequently exercise options in the alternate simulation, the expected
revenues obtained from the commitments increase. It is important to note that the percentage gaps
between ADM and the other solution methods tend to increase when we allow customers to exercise their
options at any time period. ADM adjusts the booking limits by taking into account the reservations and
not exercised options that have already taken place. Therefore, it ends up accepting more reservation
requests from lower fare classes than the deterministic model, and consequently, the revenue loss due to
empty seats is counteracted by the gains from the committed seats.
We also analyze how our approximation performs. Figure 6 presents the gap between the optimal
objective value of the approximate dynamic model and the average revenue obtained by its policy when
regular and alternate simulations are run. The rst observation we have is that the percentage gaps
are small when the length of commitment period is short. The intuition behind this result is that, as
the length increases, ADM fails to predict the dynamics of the commitment process. As a result, the
number of empty seats increases and hence, its performance deteriorates. We caution the reader to the
performances under the two simulation approaches. As Figure 6(a) depicts total revenue obtained in
the alternate simulation is always higher than the one obtained in the regular simulation. Moreover,
as the length of the commitment period increases, the performance of ADM worsens more than we
expected. This result was more striking with our regular simulation. This behavior can be attributed
to the structure of the alternate simulation. Since our approximation allows contingent commitments to
exercise their options at any time, it performs better in the alternate simulation.
We conclude the presentation of our numerical results by reporting the CPU times of the proposed
solution methods. We used a computer with 2.13 GHz Intel Pentium P6200 processor and 2 GB of RAM.
The codes are written in MATLAB R2012b running under Windows 7 operating system. The intractable
dynamic model requires on average 230 seconds for the problems where the length of commitment period
is 5. It takes on average 120 seconds to solve the approximate dynamic model. DLP requires on average
less than a second.
7. Conclusions. In this study, we introduce the concept of a commitment option. Recently such
options have been oered by airline companies. By oering this option, they aim to attract price sensitive
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Table 4: Computational results for the test problems in the alternate simulation (f c = 80)
Instances % Gap with ADM
  s pb ADM SBS DLP SBS DLP
5 0.4 68,368 51,455 66,554 24.737% 2.653%
5 0.7 66,488 42,685 64,667 35.800% 2.739%
H
25 0.4 67,939 51,455 66,369 24.262% 2.311%
25 0.7 66,465 42,685 64,693 35.779% 2.666%
50 0.4 67,351 51,455 65,873 23.602% 2.194%
1.2
50 0.7 66,220 42,685 64,540 35.541% 2.537%
5 0.4 64,333 60,362 62,607 6.172% 2.683%
5 0.7 63,598 58,056 61,924 8.714% 2.632%
L
25 0.4 64,249 60,362 62,574 6.050% 2.607%
25 0.7 63,560 58,056 61,883 8.661% 2.638%
50 0.4 64,114 60,362 62,476 5.852% 2.554%
50 0.7 63,504 58,056 61,842 8.579% 2.617%
5 0.4 78,151 63,738 75,931 18.442% 2.840%
5 0.7 76,595 56,267 74,328 26.540% 2.960%
H
25 0.4 77,499 63,738 75,338 17.756% 2.788%
25 0.7 76,379 56,267 74,228 26.332% 2.816%
50 0.4 76,650 63,738 74,360 16.844% 2.988%
1.6
50 0.7 76,014 56,267 73,880 25.979% 2.807%
5 0.4 74,246 71,411 72,168 3.819% 2.800%
5 0.7 73,615 69,289 71,599 5.877% 2.739%
L
25 0.4 74,129 71,411 72,120 3.667% 2.710%
25 0.7 73,590 69,289 71,648 5.844% 2.638%
50 0.4 73,933 71,411 71,933 2.411% 2.705%
50 0.7 73,496 69,289 71,627 5.724% 2.543%
customers as well as customers who have uncertainty in their travel time. We analyze the consequences
of selling this option along with standard bookings of the products. We derive dynamic and static
models for the capacity allocation problem. In the dynamic case, nding the optimal policy for the
actual problem would require solving a dynamic program with a high-dimensional state vector. Thus,
we propose an approximate dynamic programming formulation. In the deterministic case, we present
a linear programming model leading to an upper bound on the optimal objective value of the actual
problem.
We conduct a computational study to evaluate how oering options aects the airline's revenue. To
assess the eect of commitment decisions, we compare the performances of our model against dierent
policies. Our numerical results conrm the intuitive expectation that oering a commitment option is
most benecial when the purchase probability is high and the length of the commitment period is short.
Furthermore, considering a policy that ignores the contingent option altogether, explicitly modeling the
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(a) Total expected revenue (b) Percentage gap
Figure 6: The results related to optimal objective value of ADM and the average revenue obtained by
the optimal policy of ADM
commitment option can bring signicant revenue improvements even when the customer arrival intensity
for this option is low. Also, making the contingent commitment option available up to only a certain time
period can be more protable than making it available during the whole sales horizon, especially when
the purchase probability of the contingent commitment option is low. As the length of the commitment
period increases, limiting the availability of the commitment option may be more benecial to reap the
most benet from this option. Moreover, in our computational study we also evaluate the performance
of our approximate dynamic model. When we compare our proposed model with the actual dynamic
model, we see that there is no signicant dierence between their performances for the short commitment
period length. This shows that our approximation performs very well.
An immediate extension of this work would be to include the overbooking option. Since commitment
customers may not purchase their options and leave the system, the revenue loss due to the resulting empty
seats can be lled by overbooking the ight. In this case, the overbooking limit should be determined
by considering not exercising the option possibility of contingent commitments. Another future research
direction is the application of the contingent commitment option to network problems. Network problems
are quite dicult to solve due to the intractable state space. To overcome this diculty, approximation
methods based on decomposition are frequently proposed. However, in this case adverse eects of oering
a contingent commitment option on the shared legs of the ight should be carefully investigated.
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Appendix A. Omitted Proofs. We reserve this appendix for the proofs that we omitted in the
main document.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose the probability of a request being a commitment is class independent; that is,
1 = 2 =    = m. Then, given the fare ordering f1  f2  :::  fm, and hence, the ordering of the
expected commitment revenues, 1  2  :::  m, we have u1t  u2t  :::  umt; t = 1; :::; T .
Proof. For given x and y, to maximize Vt(xt; yt) we accept a booking or commitment request
(uit = 1) if
pit(fi+EVt+1(xt + 1 Ml(yt);Mr(yt))) + qit(i + EVt+1(xt + 1 Ml(yt);Mr(yt) + 1))
 pitEVt+1(xt  Ml(yt);Mr(yt)) + qitEVt+1(xt  Ml(yt);Mr(yt)):
Let  := 1 = 2 =    = m. Then, by using pit = (1  )it and qit = it, we obtain
(1  )(fi+EVt+1(xt + 1 Ml(yt);Mr(yt))) + (i + EVt+1(xt + 1 Ml(yt);Mr(yt) + 1))
 EVt+1(xt  Ml(yt);Mr(yt)): (17)
Since fi 1  fi and i 1  i, if relation (17) holds for a fare class i request (uit = 1), then it also holds
for the fare class i  1 request u(i 1)t = 1. Similarly, if relation (17) does not hold for the expensive fare
class i  1, then it does not hold for the cheaper fare class i either. This means that, if u(i 1)t = 0 then
uit = 0. Therefore, we obtain the desired result. 
Proposition 5.1 The optimal objective value of the DLP model gives an upper bound on the dynamic
programming model (1a)-(1b). That is, J1(0;0)  ZDLP .
Proof. Suppose the random variables Wit, 8i; t denote the number of reservations accepted over the
planning horizon under the optimal policy of the dynamic programming model. Each accepted reservation
for fare class i either buys the contingent commitment option with probability i or books the seat with
probability (1   i). Let Xit and Zit be the random numbers of bookings and commitments accepted
for fare class i at time period t, respectively. Since an accepted commitment request can leave with
probability pl, we also let Sit and Lit be the binary random numbers denoting the sold (exercised) and
not exercised commitments, respectively. That is, Sit takes value 1, if there is a commitment reservation
for fare class i at time period t and this commitment customer decides to exercise the option, and Lit
takes value 1 if this commitment reservation leaves. As a result, Xit + Zit =Wit and Sit + Lit = Zit for
all i; t.
Let now Dit be the random number of reservation requests for fare class i at time period t. Then, we
have,
V1 = C; (18)
Vt = Vt 1  
mX
i=1
Xi(t 1)  
mX
i=1
Zi(t 1); 2  t  s+ 1; (19)
Vt = Vt 1  
mX
i=1
Xi(t 1)  
mX
i=1
Zi(t 1) +
mX
i=1
Li(t s 1); s+ 2  t  T; (20)
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VT+1 = VT  
mX
i=1
XiT  
mX
i=1
ZiT +
TX
k=T s
mX
i=1
Lik; (21)
Xit + Zit  Dit; i = 1; :::;m; t = 1; :::; T; (22)
mX
i=1
Xit +
mX
i=1
Zit  Vt; t = 1; :::; T; (23)
where (18)-(21) ensure that the balance equations in each time period holds, (22) ensures that total num-
ber of bookings and commitments that we accept under the optimal policy do not exceed the reservation
requests. Similarly, (23) guarantees that the total number of bookings and commitments that we accept
do not exceed the available capacity. Consequently, the total revenue under the optimal policy of the
dynamic programming is
TX
t=1
mX
i=1
fiXit +
TX
t=1
mX
i=1
f cZit +
TX
t=1
mX
i=1
fiSit:
By conditioning on Wit we trivially obtain E(Zit) = E(Wit). Since Xit = Wit   Zit, we have
E(Xit) = (1   i)E(Wit). Similarly, conditioning on Zit leads to E(Sit) = pbiE(Wit). Therefore, the
total expected revenue is given by
J1(0;0) =
TX
t=1
mX
i=1
fi(1  i)E(Wit) +
TX
t=1
mX
i=1
f ciE(Wit) +
TX
t=1
mX
i=1
fipbiE(Wit):
Taking the expectations (18)-(23) and noting that E(Dit) = it, the solution given by wit = E(Wit) and
#t = E(Vt) is feasible for the DLP model (4)-(12). Therefore, we have
ZDLP  J1(0;0) =
TX
t=1
mX
i=1
fi(1  i)E(Wit) +
TX
t=1
mX
i=1
iiE(Wit);
and the desired result holds. 
To prove the asymptotic bound result in Proposition 5.2, we rst dene a lower bound on the rate of
convergence. Let dib and dic denote the random numbers of total fare class i requests for bookings and
commitments, respectively. Then, the expected demands are computed as bi := E(dib) = (1 i)
PT
t=1 it
and ci := E(dic) = i
PT
t=1 it. Likewise, ib and ic denote the corresponding standard deviations.
Then, the coecient of variation of the number of requests for bookings and commitments are given as
CV bi =
p
2ib
bi
and CV ci =
p
2ic
ci
; for i = 1; :::;m:
We also dene
CV = max
1im
n
CV bi ; CV
c
i
o
;
as the maximum coecient of variation.
Proposition A.1 Let CV denote the maximum coecient of variation over bookings and commitments
for all fare classes. Then for  2 [1  pb; 1], we have J1(0;0) 

1    CV 22

ZDLP UB.
Proof. Let fwit : 8i; tg be the optimal value of the decision variables in problem (13)-(16). We
consider a policy  that accepts at most (1  )(1  i)
PT
t=1 w

it booking requests and (1  )i
PT
t=1 w

it
contingent commitment requests for fare class i for  2 (0; 1). Due to the capacity constraint (14) in
DLP-UB model, the policy  is feasible if (1  )  pb. The expected revenue P is given by
P = E[
mX
i=1
fimin(dib; (1  )
TX
t=1
(1  i)wit) +
mX
i=1
f cmin(dic; (1  )
TX
t=1
iw

it)+
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mX
i=1
fiS(min(dic; (1  )
TX
t=1
iw

it))];
where S(k) is a binomial random variable with k independent trials with success probability pb and it
gives the number of purchased committed seats. A lower bound to the generic term in the expression for
P is then given by
E[min(dic; (1  )
TX
t=1
iw

it)]  (1  )
TX
t=1
iw

itP(dic  (1  )
TX
t=1
iw

it) (24)
 (1  )
TX
t=1
iw

itP(dic  (1  )
TX
t=1
iit) (25)
 (1  )
TX
t=1
iw

it

1  CV
c
i
2
CV ci
2 + 2

(26)
 (1  )
TX
t=1
iw

it

1  CV
2
2

: (27)
The inequality (25) holds since iw

it  iit, (26) follows from the Marshall's inequality and (27) holds
due to the denition of CV . Since E[S(min(dic; (1  )
PT
t=1 iw

it))] = pbE[min(dic; (1  )
PT
t=1 iw

it)],
we can give a lower bound to P by using the inequality (27) as follows:
P  (1  )

1  CV
2
2

(
mX
i=1
TX
t=1
fi(1  i)wit +
mX
i=1
TX
t=1
f ciw

it +
mX
i=1
TX
t=1
fipbiw

it)
 (1  )

1  CV
2
2

ZDLP UB


1    CV
2
2

ZDLP UB
This implies
J1(0;0)  P 

1    CV
2
2

ZDLP UB :

To tighten the lower bound in the above inequality, we maximize it over  and obtain  =
maxf(2CV 2)1=3; 1   pbg. Since  2 [1   pb; 1], this tighter bound is only obtained when 2CV 2 < 1.
Consequently we have,
J1(0;0)  P 

1     CV
2
2

ZDLP UB :
Next we examine the structure of the lower bound as the problem size gets large.
Proposition 5.2 Given  2 [1  pb; 1] and  > 0, we have
ZDLP UB  ZDLP  J1 (0;0) 

1    CV
2
2

ZDLP UB ;
where CV denotes the maximum coecient of variation over bookings and commitments for all fare
classes. Therefore,
pb  lim
!1
J1 (0;0)
ZDLP
 1:
Proof. We observe that if fwit : 8i; tg is an optimal solution to problem (13)-(16). Then fwidt=e :
8i; tg is an optimal solution for the scaled problem. Thus, it follows that ZDLP UB = ZDLP UB . For
Aydn, Birbil, Topaloglu: Delayed Purchases in ARM 25
the scaled problems, the expected demand and the variance are scaled with . If  and 2 denote the
mean demand and variance for problem P1, then the mean demand is  and the variance is 2 for the
problem P. Therefore the maximum coecient of variation of the scaled problem is
CV  = max
1im
np2ib
bi
;
p
2ic
ci
o
=
CV
p


By following the result of Proposition A.1 and replacing CV  with CV
p

 , we have
J1 (0;0) 

1    CV
2
2

ZDLP UB :
When  goes to innity, the expression

1      CV 22

approaches to (1   ). Since  2 [1   pb; 1],
this bound is tighter when  = 1   pb. Therefore, as pb goes to 1, the upper bound obtained from
ZDLP UB becomes asymptotically tight. Following the result of Proposition A.1, we obtain the following
convergence rate
ZDLP UB  ZDLP  J1 (0;0) 

1    CV
2
2

ZDLP UB ;
Dividing the chain of inequalities by ZDLP UB and taking the limit as  goes to innity, we get
pb  lim
!1
J1 (0;0)
ZDLP UB
 lim
!1
ZDLP
ZDLP UB
 1
which implies,
pb  lim
!1
J1 (0;0)
ZDLP
 1:

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